Designing an electricity tax system in presence of international regulations and multiple public goals : an empirical assessment by Bjertnæs, Geir Haakon et al.
Discussion Papers No. 555, September 2008 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Geir H. Bjertnæs, Taran Fæhn, Jørgen Aasness 
Designing an electricity tax 
system in presence of 
international regulations and 
multiple public goals:  
An empirical assessment 
Abstract: 
The European competition rules restrict governments’ opportunity to differentiate terms of energy 
accessibility among firms and industries. This easily runs counter with regional and industrial goals of 
national energy policies. Norway levies a tax on use of electricity, but exempts main industrial 
usages. This analysis assesses alternative, internationally legal, designs of the system in terms of 
their effects on efficiency and distribution, including industrial objectives. Among the reforms we 
explore, removing the exemptions would be the most effective way of raising revenue, but it would be 
politically costly by deteriorating the competitiveness of today's favoured industries. An entire 
abolishment of the electricity tax, and replacing revenue by increased VAT, would generate a more 
equal distribution of standard of living and, at the same time, avoid the trade-off between efficiency 
and competitiveness.   
Keywords: Tax reform; Multiple policy goals; Computable general equilibrium model 
JEL classification: D31, D58, F15, H21, H23, J68, L52 
Acknowledgement: We are grateful for comments from Ådne Cappelen, as well as from participants 
at the 62nd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, August 2006 and at The 
Norwegian Tax Forum, June 2006, with special thanks to Stephen Smith, Geir Åvitsland, and Lars-
Erik Borge. We acknowledge financial support from the Tax Economics Programme of Norwegian 
Research Council and from Statistics Norway 
Address: Geir H. Bjertnæs, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: 
geir.h.bjertnas@ssb.no 
Taran Fæhn, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: taran.fahn@ssb.no 
Jørgen Aasness, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: 
jorgen.aasness@ssb.no 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers  
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
NO-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
3 
1 Introduction 
A typical feature of electricity tax systems has been that exemptions or concessional rates have been 
granted to certain industries, usages or geographical areas (OECD, 2001). Differentiation is 
problematic because it distorts competition. European legislation and enforcement authorities go far in 
prohibiting discriminatory taxation practise among enterprises. This analysis explores possible 
adaptations of the energy taxation system of a small European economy, Norway, in response to EU’s 
ban on industrial discrimination. Our perspective is the practical of the national policymaker, who 
makes decisions in a second-best world and has to consider the simultaneous effects on multiple 
domestic policy objectives.  
 
In common with several countries both inside and outside the European Economic Area, Norway taxes 
the use of electricity in households and industries (OECD, 2007). Electricity consumption faces a tax 
of 1.2 Eurocents/KWh. The tax serves more or less explicit public goals. A traditionally cited concern, 
that had more substance before the recent decades’ market liberalisations, was the securing of a sound 
balance within the market for scarce energy.  Often, environmental arguments also back the desire to 
regulate demand. Most applied energy technologies have negative external effects on nature, health 
and/or climate. This is also true for Norway. Until today hydroelectric power installations have 
supplied the Norwegian grids and have caused harm on natural landscapes, waterfalls and rivers. At 
present, gas power with CO2 emissions is the marginal Norwegian power technology. Another given 
argument for taxing energy use is that in policymakers’ chase for public revenue, energy stands out as 
a more acceptable tax base among their voters than alternatives like income or property value 
(Goulder, 1994).  
 
In order to meet distributive goals in the regional and industrial policy area, exemptions have 
traditionally been granted to areas in the far north, as well as to the manufacturing sector. The 
preference of certain sectors is at variance with the EU environmental aid rules of 23 May 2003. 
Norwegian manufacturers were therefore referred to EFTA’s Surveillance Authority (ESA) for 
illegally receiving aid likely to distort international competition. This in turn led to a temporary 
exemption from the electricity tax for all commercial undertakings during the first six months of 2004. 
The last half of 2004, however, saw the enforcement of a tax differentiation scheme based on type of 
electricity usage – a legitimate construction according to EU rules – rather than type of economic 
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output. The system exploits numerous derogation clauses and temporary provisions in EU law, hence 
resulting in virtually the same balance of industries and level of revenue as the former system.1  
 
This article assesses three alternative systems that also comply with the ESA requirements. We look at 
their performance in terms of their effects on the following traditional tax policy aims: (i) minimising 
efficiency costs of generating tax revenue, (ii) maintaining the competitiveness of manufacturing 
enterprises in peripheral areas, and (iii) promoting a fair real income distribution among households. 
Energy and environmental policy goals are not considered. While acknowledging environmental 
externalities from energy production and consumption, we do a priori dismiss the electricity tax as a 
suitable environmental policy instrument, as it does not differentiate between environmentally friendly 
and harmful use of power. As such it does not offer any encouragement to consumers or producers to 
opt for environmentally friendly energy. More effective and well-established forms of environmental 
taxation are available and should be devoted to environmental goals.2 
 
Section 2 describes the reforms and assesses them in light of the relevant theoretical rules derived 
within the literature. While being valuable rules of thumb, stylised results on optimal taxation are not 
directly applicable within this empirical, multi-goal setting. Only reforms that are politically and 
practically feasible are real candidates, and their pros and cons in terms of several objectives need to 
be balanced. In order to study such impacts we apply an empirical macroeconomic model. It is 
outlined in section 3. We numerically analyse three different adaptations to the EU directives in 
section 4. The first, The ordinary tax rate reform, introduces the current electricity tax rate among all 
users and usages, including all energy purposes of the manufacturing industries. The second, The 
enterprise exemption reform, excludes all commercial undertakings from the tax base, while the third, 
The complete removal reform, considers a full dismantling of the system. This is the only reform in 
our study that affects household distribution noteworthy. We, thus, omit other alternatives with 
potential distributive effects, like progressive systems. We come back to this limitation of our scope in 
section 4.3. In section 5 we sum up the analyses, and the reforms are compared with respect to the 
achievements and possible trade-offs they imply.  
 
Our main result is that a complete removal of the electricity tax system financed by an increase in the 
general VAT complies with all the national policy objectives. We obtain a more equal distribution of 
                                                     
1 Other European examples of differentiated tax systems include the Swedish, Dutch and Italian systems (see Norwegian 
Ministry of Finance, 2004). 
2 There are cases where indirect tax instruments are optimal. However, settings where direct instruments are optimal are more 
relevant to our case (see the discussion in Green and Sheshinski, 1976).  
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the standard of living among households at virtually no cost in terms of efficiency losses or changes in 
the competitiveness of industries. Keeping the electricity tax system, but extending the tax base to all 
usages, would be the most effective way of raising revenue, but it would be more costly in terms of 
industrial policy aims and income distribution. 
2 Electricity tax reforms and political objectives  
All the reforms we study imply shifts in two policy instruments, first, changes in the electricity rates 
and, second, a budget-balancing change in one other revenue generator. When compared to the 
Business-as-Usual (BaU) scenario (that represents the current differentiated electricity tax system), 
The ordinary tax rate reform comprises: 
• The ordinary rate component: The manufacturing industries are faced by an electricity tax rate at 
the same level as the rate already imposed on households and remaining industries. 
• The revenue recycling component: The revenue is recycled back through a uniform percentage pay 
roll tax rate decrease for all firms. 
The enterprise exemption reform has the following two components:    
• The enterprise exemption component: The ordinary rate posed on primary industries and service 
industries is replaced by a zero rate, as already applies to the manufacturing industries.   
• The financing component: The loss of revenue from exempting enterprises is regained by increas-
ing the percentage VAT rate on all goods.   
The two parts comprising The complete removal reform are:    
• The complete removal component: The ordinary rate posed on primary industries,  service indus-
tries, and households is replaced by a zero rate.   
• The full financing component: The loss of revenue from dismantling the whole electricity tax sys-
tem is regained by increasing the percentage VAT rate on all goods.   
 
Though tax revenue is, per definition, unaltered, the reforms imply changes in the composition of tax 
bases. This has implications for the macroeconomic allocation of resources and thus the efficiency 
costs of financing public expenditures. Practically all taxation involves efficiency costs. The question 
is whether other sources of revenue come at a lower socio-economic cost than the differentiated 
electricity tax system of today.  
 
Economic theory offers some useful rules of thumb on how electricity tax reforms are likely to affect 
the social cost of collecting revenue. First, the regulatory environment in which firms operate should 
be the same for all. This point, in isolation, suggests that a uniform rate would be more socially 
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efficient than the current system. This conclusion applies unless market deficiencies or aspects of the 
political system already divert resources to less productive undertakings and should be corrected by 
arrangements in favour of the manufacturing sector.  
 
Another theoretical finding suggests that taxing factor inputs should be avoided. To ensure efficient 
input of resources it might be better to tax household rather than commercial consumption (Diamond 
and Mirlees, 1971). This favours exempting the business sector from electricity tax, as we do in the 
second and third reform.  
 
A third point is that taxing consumption, like taxing income, reduces people’s time spent on work in 
favour of more leisure time, see Goulder and Williams (2003). Effective taxation of income from 
labour in Norway, which comprises direct labour income tax, payroll tax, VAT and other indirect 
taxes including the electricity tax, is high. Reforms that reduce this tax wedge, or otherwise stimulate 
labour supply, might therefore reduce the efficiency cost of collecting taxes. In all the systems we 
study, the electricity tax components in isolation alter the public budget balance and have to be 
counteracted by changes in other revenue-generating taxes. We look at adjustments in VAT rates and 
pay roll tax rates, which both take part in the price wedge in the labour market. Á priori we can say 
that reductions in the pay roll tax rate in the first reform will contribute to improve economic 
efficiency within the labour market and reinforce the welfare gains of equalising electricity tax rates. 
In the second and third reform the VAT rates are raised. In isolation, this will expectedly reduce the 
efficiency of time spending.   
 
A fourth principle, which applies to consumption taxes, was articulated initially by Ramsey (1927) and 
says that inelastic goods like electricity should be taxed at a higher rate than other goods, in order to 
minimise distortions. The Norwegian indirect tax on household consumption of electricity consists of 
both the electricity tax and ordinary VAT on consumption, and hence, is in line with this principle. In 
the third reform we reduce the tax on final consumption of electricity at the cost of increasing the 
overall VAT rate. According to Ramsey (1927) we should expect an isolated social efficiency loss due 
to this tax swapping.   
 
These principles of economic efficiency are deduced within simple models under stylised conditions. 
The design of actual electricity tax systems is, however, restricted by national and international 
legislation, practicability assessments and political objectives. The efficiency of the electricity tax 
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needs to be considered within the regulatory environment where the reforms take place. We do this by 
applying a detailed empirical general equilibrium (CGE) model, described in the next section.  
 
Some of the efficiency principles mentioned above seemingly run counter to distributive aims. 
Industrial and regional distribution motives suggest giving certain industries concessional rates, as 
opposed to the principle of equal regulatory environments for all. In the Norwegian political setting, 
there has been a willingness to facilitate the continued competitiveness of the power-intensive 
productions of metals, chemicals and pulp and paper. Subsequently, these industries have enjoyed 
several benefits. Besides electricity tax exemptions, they face low-price power contracts, low payroll 
taxes in the areas they are located, and exemption from CO2 taxes. Apart from these industries’ 
importance as job creators and prosperity sources in many rural areas, the policy is motivated by their 
role as prime export industries. Given Norwegian economy’s special – some would say exposed – 
situation with offshore oil and gas as the main sources of foreign exchange, ensuring further 
competence and viability of exposed mainland sectors is crucial. In section 4 we make use of the 
macroeconomic model to determine how far alternative electricity tax designs for the commercial 
sector affect the competitiveness of the power-intensive industry, in particular.  
 
A further distributive issue concerns the electricity tax levied on households. Generally speaking, 
reducing indirect taxes on goods consumed at a relatively higher rate by low-income households 
would be beneficial from a redistribution point of view. The wider the gap in budget shares between 
low- and high-income households, the better the distributive effect. Electricity consumption has 
relatively high budget shares in low-income households, and stands out as an obvious candidate for tax 
reduction from a distribution angle. Note that efficiency considerations referred to above came to the 
opposite result. The literature on optimal taxation finds that necessities should be taxed with higher 
rates on pure efficiency grounds. However, when equity concerns are introduced, subsidies may render 
optimal (see Myles 1995). In section 4.3 we analyse the distributive effects of the third Complete 
removal reform, which is the only reform that affect household distribution noteworthy. By comparing 
the distribution and efficiency effects in money-metric terms we provide a clarification of the trade off 
between these two concerns.  
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3 The macroeconomic equilibrium model 
3.1 General features 
The model is a version of the empirical macro economic model MSG6 of the Norwegian economy. 
The model is calibrated against the Norwegian national accounts and supplemented with detailed 
information on energy flows according to the Norwegian energy accounts. The model is disaggregated 
into 40 private (see Table 1) and 8 governmental production activities and provides a relatively 
detailed representation of production, consumption, trade and economic policy interventions. It is an 
equilibrium model in the sense that the determination of market prices clarifies the markets for goods, 
services and production factors. Products and factors can be moved between applications and across 
borders. Labour is, however, only mobile domestically. The country participates in the international 
financial markets and faces an exogenous interest rate. The model provides a relatively exhaustive 
representation of the policy instruments available to the government, and how they affect private 
sector behaviour and overall economic welfare in terms of efficiency. Assuming the authorities 
maintain a balanced budget, changing the electricity tax must be balanced by changes to other budget 
items. For a more extensive and formal description of the applied model version, confer Bjertnæs and 
Fæhn (2008).3 
3.2 Consumer behaviour 
Consumption, labour supply, and savings result from the decisions of an infinitely lived representative, 
forward-looking household, which maximises its welfare, defined as the present value of utility. It can 
adjust its utility among periods by borrowing or saving at the given interest rate subject to an 
intertemporal budget constraint. This constraint is derived from an economy-wide intertemporal 
budget constraint, which follows from not allowing foreign debt or wealth to explode in the long run. 
The forward-looking behaviour of households provides a consistent welfare measure, defined as the 
sum of discounted period-specific utilities. Utility in each period depends on the consumption of 
leisure time, along with consumption of 26 different goods and services (including the energy goods 
electricity, fuels for heating and fuels for transport), nested in a Origo-adjusted Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution (OCES) utility tree structure; see Figure 1 (Aasness and Holtsmark, 1995). As the 
representative agent assumption excludes information on household distribution of income and 
consumption, our assessment of redistributive effects is based on detailed household information 
underlying the aggregate representation in MSG6. These data are organised in the micro-simulation 
                                                     
3 Heide et al. (2004) present a formal, one-sector version.  
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model, LOTTE (Statistics Norway, 2006). Section 4.3 describes the method of calculating 
redistributive impacts among income groups.  
 
Table 1: Non-government production activities in MSG6 
Agriculture 
Forestry 
Fishing 
Breeding of Fish 
Manufacture of Fish Products 
Manufacture of Meat and Dairy Products 
Production of Grain, Vegetables, Fruit, Oils, etc. 
Production of Beverages and Tobacco 
Manufacture of Textiles, Apparel, and Footwear 
Manufacture of Furniture and Fixtures 
Production of Chemical and Mineral Products, incl. Mining and Quarrying 
Printing and Publishing 
Manufacture of Pulp and Paper Articles 
Manufacture of Industrial Chemicals 
Gasoline Refining 
Diesel Fuel Refining 
Heating Fuels, Paraffin, etc. Refining 
Manufacture of Metals 
Manufacture of Metal Products, Machinery, and Equipment 
Hired Work and Repairs 
Building of Ships 
Manufacture and repair of oil drilling rigs and ships, oil production platforms etc. 
Construction, excl. Oil Well Drilling 
Ocean Transport – Foreign 
Finance and Insurance Servicing 
Crude Oil Exploration 
Natural Gas Exploration 
Servicing in Oil and Gas Exploration 
Pipeline Transport of Oil and Gas 
Production of Electricity 
Power Net Renting 
Sales and Distribution of Electricity 
Car and Other Land Transportation 
Air Transport 
Railroads and Electrical Commuters 
Ocean Transport – Domestic 
Post and Tele Communication 
Wholesale and Retail Trade 
Dwelling Servicing 
Other Private Servicing 
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Figure 1. The preference structure of the household in the MSG6 model. 
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Private transport Public transport
Sea A ir Rail/ 
tram way
Beverages 
and tobacco 
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m aintenance 
Health 
E dit
O ther services 
E lectric appliances
Road
 
3.3 Producer behaviour, technology and product markets 
Producer behaviour is generally specified at the firm level. Managers of firms are assumed to be 
rational and forward-looking and to maximise the present value of the cashflow to owners. This 
behaviour implies maximisation of profit in each period, which originates from sales in domestic and 
export markets net of variable costs and a fixed period-specific investment cost in entrepreneurship 
(knowledge, network, risk etc.). Variable inputs are nested in a detailed tree-structure of CES-
aggregates; see Figure 2, with individual elasticities of substitution at each level (see Mysen (1991) 
and Alfsen et al. (1996) for their empirical foundation). All factors are completely mobile and 
malleable, including labour.4  
                                                     
4 One exception is the production of electricity; see Holmøy et al. (1994). 
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Figure 2: The separable factor use structure of the firms in the MSG6 model. 
 
Variable input Services from structures 
Modified value added Commodity  inputs
Man-hours and mechanized services 
Mechanized services Man-hours
Transport
Nonpolluting transport
Gross production
Polluting transport 
Machinery Electricity for machines Own transport Commercial transport
Petrol and diesel Transport equipment
Heating 
Fuels for heating Electricity for heating
Services from buildings
  
Each industry consists of numerous companies of varying size and productivity. Thus, production can 
increase either by increasing within-firm production, where there is decreasing returns to scale5, or by 
establishing new firms. Firms enter until after-tax profits of the marginal firm equals zero. The 
marginal firm is the least effective, thus giving rise to another source of decreasing returns - at the 
industry level.  
 
Each firm produces one variety of the industry-specific product that is an imperfect substitute for the 
other varieties. Increasing the use of the product by increasing the number of varieties is assumed to be 
more efficient than increasing the amounts of the existing varieties. Agents have so-called love of 
variety preferences; see Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The domestic market structure is assumed to be a 
large group case of monopolistic competition, where each firm has some market power in their home 
markets. According to evidence on markup pricing by Norwegian firms (Klette, 1999 and Bowitz and 
                                                     
5  Elasticities of scale are set to 0.83 in all industries, which fit Norwegian econometric findings of moderate decreasing 
returns (Klette, 1999). 
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Cappelen, 2001), market power is small; in most industries markups are set to 5 percent of marginal 
costs.6 
 
In the world markets domestic firms have no market power and the prices are assumed unresponsive to 
domestic demand and supply. Thus, the country cannot have endogenous terms-of-trade gains by 
adjusting export quantity. The only exception is the Nordic electricity price; see next subsection. The 
export markets and the home markets are assumed to be partly segregated, in the sense that there are 
adjustment costs involved in reallocating deliveries between the two markets. This is modelled by a 
constant-elasticity-of-transformation function, which implies that the production functions for the two 
markets are separable. Somewhat analogously, domestic and imported products are modelled as 
imperfectly substitutable, according to the Armington hypothesis. This, along with the segregation 
assumption of markets, allows the development of the domestic prices to deviate from the exogenous 
world market prices according to evidence. 
 
There are some exemptions to this general modelling of firms. Relatively homogenous raw materials 
like oil, natural gas, fish, agricultural products, and electricity are specified at the industry level, rather 
than firm level. They obtain the same price in domestic and world markets, and the model determines 
trade in net terms, only. Due to heavy policy regulations, production within agriculture, fisheries and 
offshore oil and gas exploration, along with public servicing, are set exogenously.  
3.4 The electricity market 
The only international price that responds to changes in domestic behaviour is the electricity price. 
The Norwegian electricity market is part of a Nordic, competitive market and domestic supply and 
demand empirically affect the market price. We have introduced an estimated relation in the CGE 
model between the Nordic price and Norwegian net imports. It predicts that an increase of 1 TWh in 
net imports increase the Nordic price by 0.03 eurocents/KWh. The estimations are made on simulated 
data from a numerical, Nordic electricity market model.7   
 
The electricity production is modelled in particular detail and engineering data are explored to 
represent technologies; see Holmøy et al (1994). The current Norwegian supply of electricity is based 
on hydropower. This supply is assumed to grow exogenously, but at a decreasing rate, to represent the 
                                                     
6 The elasticity of substitution among the varieties of a product is calibrated to be consistent with the estimated markup ratios. 
In order to maximise profits, the firm sets the markup ratio equal to σ/(σ−1), where σ is the substitution elasticity among 
varieties.   
7 Aune and Hansen (2008) document the estimations, while Johnsen (1998) documents the Nordic electricity market model.  
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limited possibility to develop new hydropower capacity. Along the paths, gas power capacity is 
endogenously faced in as a back- stop technology when the marginal willingness to pay for electricity 
equals or exceeds the long-run marginal cost of expanding the gas power that includes investment 
costs. 
 
Domestic demand for electricity is the sum of demand from each production and consumption sector. 
Market equilibrium requires that domestic demand equals the sum of domestic supply and net import. 
This implies that before gas power is faced in, harmonisation of the electricity tax limits domestic 
demand and stimulates net export accordingly. In later stages, when gas power is the marginal 
technology, domestic electricity generation contracts, and more of the available Norwegian gas is 
exported.  
3.5 The government 
The government collects taxes, distributes transfers, and purchases goods and services from the 
industries and abroad. Overall government expenditure is exogenous and increases at a constant rate. 
The model incorporates a detailed account of the government’s revenues and expenditures. In the 
policy experiments it is required that the nominal deficit and real government spending follow the 
same path as in the baseline scenario, implying revenue neutrality in each period. 
4 Numerical results 
4.1 Reform 1: The ordinary tax rate reform 
4.1.1 Main allocative and macroeconomic effects 
As outlined in section 2, The ordinary tax rate reform has two components, an increase to the ordinary 
electricity tax rate in manufacturing industries, and a cut in the pay roll tax rates of all enterprises. The 
direct effect of the former is to increase the input prices of electricity by 1.2 Eurocents/KWh, 
measured in 1999 prices. This represents a 30 per cent electricity price increase in most manufacturing 
industries along the path. For the power-intensive manufacturing industries the percentage price 
increase is larger as they initially enjoy low electricity prices. This is partly due to lower distribution 
costs per KWh, and partly due to favourable long-term price contracts with the government (that 
expire in 2010-2012). In the first year, the direct price increase averages 60 percent for the power-
intensive manufacturing industries, while the increase is 47 percent on average in the long run. The 
revenue recycling reduces the payroll tax rate by between 5 and 6 percent along the path.    
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The results of the equilibrium responses to these changes are summed up in Table 2.8 The two reform 
components have opposite effects on domestic prices. The electricity tax increase implies a contraction 
of output in the power-reliant manufacturing industries. Their subsequent drop in input demand causes 
decreased pre-tax electricity prices, wages and other factor prices. Since the power-reliant 
manufacturing industries are important export revenue generators, a real depreciation has to take place 
in the long run, also explaining the fall in domestic factor prices.9 The revenue recycling counteracts 
the wage rate reductions, both by increasing labour demand and by improving the competitiveness of 
domestic firms. The net effect of the total reform is, nevertheless, to reduce domestic wages by 0.7% 
in the long run; see Table 2. 
 
The demand reductions in the Nordic electricity market are significant. The Norwegian production of 
gas power is reduced, and the introduction is postponed by 5 years (from 2012 to 2017). Norwegian 
net electricity export increases. The price responses in the Nordic markets are substantial in the first 15 
years. However, after about 15 years the electricity price remains virtually unaffected. At that stage, 
gas power represents the marginal source in the Nordic market, and the costs of gas power do not 
respond to the Norwegian reform.   
 
Long run GDP falls by 0.35 per cent. While a small reduction of labour supply of 0.06 per cent 
follows the wage drop, the main explanation to lower production is a fall in the aggregate capital stock 
of 0.38 percent. The capital demand is seriously affected by the downscaling of the electricity-
intensive export sector and the gas power generation, which are both highly capital-intensive. 
Table 2 The ordinary tax rate reform: main economic effects. Percentage deviation from BaU. 
                                   Period 2005 2015 Steady state 
Payroll tax rate -5.4 -5.8 -5.6 
Pre-tax electricity price -18.2 -4.7 -0.9 
Nominal wage rate to workers -0.3 -0.7 -0.7 
Consumer price index  -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 
Production in power-intensive manufacturing -12.0               -12.1              -20.0 
Production of electricity 1.3 -4.0 -8.9 
GDP 0.04 -0.11 -0.35 
Real capital  0.08 -0.27 -0.38 
Consumption  0.05 0.06 0.09 
Labour supply 0.09 -0.04 -0.06 
Utility 0.00 0.05 0.08 
Export -0.93 -1.11 -4.20 
Import -1.30 -1.45 -1.26 
 
                                                     
8 A more thorough description of the macroeconomic responses of the model is available in Bjertnæs and Fæhn (2008). 
9 The nominal exchange rate is numeraire in the model.  
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Consumption of goods and services is allowed to increase in this economy, as resources are diverted 
from export production.  In the long run, consumption increases 0.09 per cent at the expense of export, 
which falls by 4.20 per cent. Utility of the representative consumer increases by 0.08 per cent in the 
long run, both due to increased consumption and increased leisure. 
4.1.2 Costs of revenue generation  
As this reform involves a widening of the base of the ordinary electricity tax rate, the government can 
for a given budget reduce revenue from other tax bases. The efficiency aim of the government weighs 
towards picking a tax that is presumably already inefficiently high. We have chosen the pay roll tax, 
motivated by the initial considerable marginal tax on labour.  
 
The simulations reveal that this tax shifting increases social efficiency, measured as the welfare of the 
representative household, by 0.04 per cent. Measured in per capita terms, this amounts to 29.1 € as an 
annual average.10 The welfare effect was expected to be small, as the reform involves but minor 
changes in the tax systems. The modest effect is also a result of various allocations pulling welfare in 
opposite directions. The main positive contributions are reductions of two tax wedges in the economy, 
the initial electricity price discrimination among industries and the taxation of labour income. The 
reform is also associated with a modest terms-of-trade loss in the electricity market that pulls the 
welfare downwards. As Norway is a net exporter of electricity in this reform scenario, the Nordic price 
decrease of electricity generates a terms-of-trade loss.  
 
Analysing the effects of the electricity tax component, in isolation, reveals that only a quarter of the 
welfare gain is due to this component, while the residual ¾ stems from adding the pay roll tax 
recycling. Still, the positive outcome of uniforming the electricity tax rate, per se, indicates that the 
recommendation from the theoretical literature of striving to equalise regulatory interventions among 
firms also applies in the empirical Norwegian economic setting. The gain is caused mainly by the 
reforms’ effect of diverting electricity and other resources from the power-intensive sector, where 
social returns are low in consequence of industrial policy, as well as narrow margins in export 
production. This confirms results from other applied studies of industrial policy measures provided for 
the power-intensive sector. Bye and Nyborg, 2003 find that exempting these industries from the 
ordinary CO2 tax is inefficient for the economy at large, while Bye et al., 1999 find similar results with 
respect to the sector’s low-price power contracts. The gains of re-injecting resources into the economy 
                                                     
10 This is computed by dividing the present value of the welfare (at a discount rate equal to the interest rate) by 4.6m 
inhabitants. 
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via pay roll tax reductions are mainly explained by the reduction of the high effective tax rate on 
labour.11 Besides reducing the tax wedge, this, in isolation, increases the labour supply. While the 
labour supply reaction to the electricity tax change is to drop by 0.21 per cent in the long run, most of 
this is offset by the pay roll tax reduction. 
The welfare computations we make rest on the assumption that resources can move costlessly among 
industries; see section 3. By this, we omit short-term adjustment costs associated with reallocations. In 
practice we know that restructuring takes time and that unemployment and other unutilised resources 
represent costs in connection with such processes. Fehr and Hjørungdal (1999) analyse adjustment 
costs in affected Norwegian regions associated with standardising the price of electricity. They find 
that restructuring capacity is good for most of the regions, while certain municipalities are less 
resilient. Lessons from other restructuring processes show, according to the study, that restructuring 
can indeed proceed quickly and painlessly.  
4.1.3 Impact on industrial distribution and competitiveness 
ESA’s objection concerns the favourable treatment of the exposed domestic manufacturing sector. 
One of our questions is therefore to what degree compliance with the EU law will have to damage 
competitiveness of this sector. Competitiveness can be viewed from different angles. We let 
international competitiveness mean the ability of Norwegian firms to compete in terms of cost with 
foreign firms in the same industry. We also speak of an industry’s domestic competitiveness as its 
ability to access domestic resources relative to other industries.  
 
The direct impact of including the manufacturing sector into the ordinary tax base is to raise the costs 
of the firms, especially of the power-intensive. However, before concluding on the likely effects on 
their competitiveness, we also need to understand how the reforms affect the remaining economy. 
First, changes in other parts of the economy may eventually feed back to the manufacturing firms 
through altered prices. The most important factors would be changes in the pre-tax price of power, 
along with changes in other factor prices in response to cost, substitution and demand effects in a 
range of markets. Second, in order to assess the impact on domestic competitiveness, we need to 
decide how the manufacturing industry is affected relative to other industries. For the moment we let 
other areas of the tax system proceed unchanged, and transfer the extra tax revenue directly to the 
household sector.  
 
                                                     
11 In a CGE study using the same model MSG6, Holmøy and Strøm (2004) show that the marginal cost of funds are more or 
less identical by use of VAT and payroll tax. Both recycling mechanisms reduce the effective taxation of labour. 
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Table 3 reports long-term results of the model analysis. Column I shows the relative changes in the 
industries’ international competitiveness defined as the relation between the producer price abroad and 
at home. This ratio will correspond to the relative marginal cost level, as the markups are constant. If 
the domestic price level falls, competitiveness rises, and Norwegian firms will claim a larger share of 
the home market (column II) and of the external market, measured as percentage changes in 
Norwegian exports (column III). These changes will be mirrored by the relative change in the 
industry's ability to attract domestic resources, reflected by its activity level as a share of the total 
economic activity (column V). Relative changes in domestic competitiveness depend on the cost 
changes relative to that of the economy as a whole (column IV)12.  
Table 3: The ordinary tax rate reform: long-term competitiveness and market share effects. Per-
centage deviation from BaU. 
  International competitiveness Domestic competitiveness 
 
I Competitive-
   nessa 
II Domestic  
    market sharesb
III Export 
        
IV Competitive-  
      nessa 
V Production  
     sharec 
Power intensive manufactures -2.21 -0.19 -21.84 -3.10 -19.65 
Other manufactures 0.64 0.70 1.01 -0.20 1.55 
Raw materials and services 1.01 0.23 1.01 0.15 1.19 
Electricity - - - 0.03 -6.40 
a Changes in international competitiveness are defined as the changes in the relative marginal cost levels abroad and at home, while changes 
in domestic competitiveness measure the cost level changes in the industry relative to that of the economy at large.  
b Domestic market share changes are changes in deliveries from domestic producers relative to imports.  
c Production share changes are operationalised as the changes in industry output levels relative to economy-wide output.  
-: Not defined. 
 
As Table 3 shows, imposing the ordinary tax rate on all industries, including the manufacturing 
industries, will deteriorate the competitiveness of the power-intensive sector, as expected, and shrink 
the market shares abroad and at home. In particular, the production of goods for export will fall 
drastically. The impact on the rest of the manufacturing industries – which also enjoy electricity tax 
exemptions before the reform – would be much less dramatic. In fact, over the longer term other 
manufacturing industries would see a slight improvement to its international competitiveness as falling 
wage levels would eventually outweigh the effect of the electricity tax rise. Other factor inputs, such 
as capital, will partly be imported at unaffected foreign prices, and experience a more temperate fall in 
price. The reform would hence stimulate relatively labour-intensive undertakings most. The model is 
based on today's industry pattern and current technological evidence. How this labour-intensive part of 
the economy will look like in the distant future, is of course difficult to say. New activities could 
spring up and existing ones disappear.  
                                                     
12 This is measured as the producer price at home for the sector relative to a production-weighted average price for the whole 
economy, from which we omitted the oil and gas sector.  
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The fact that the producer price of power falls in this reform (see Table 2), reflects that some of the 
higher tax burden is shifted on to power suppliers in the Nordic market. The international 
competitiveness of Norwegian power producers is not affected, because the producer price reduction 
applies to all competitors in the Nordic market. But the domestic competitiveness of the Norwegian 
power producers will be impaired. First, the highly capital-intensive nature of the power sector means 
domestic competitiveness would be harmed by wage rates falling more than rates on capital. Second, 
they will suffer from that part of the willingness to pay for electricity goes to paying higher taxes 
rather than underwriting power production costs. These effects combine to reduce power production’s 
share of Norwegian production activity (column V).  
 
In this analysis, we have not taken into account that some of the extra tax revenue from extending the 
tax base could be devoted to keep up the competitiveness of the power-intensive manufacturing sector. 
We address various forms of compensation to the power-intensive sector in Bjertnæs and Fæhn (2008) 
and Bjertnæs (2005). The findings suggest that at least 50 per cent of the efficiency gain connected 
with introducing ordinary tax rates in the manufacturing sector could be retained, even after 
compensation.13 Although these results at first glance diminish the force of the competitiveness 
argument of tax-exempting the manufacturing sector, the studied compensation schemes are stylised 
illustrations that lend little attention to juridical or practical aspects. We cannot, therefore, conclude on 
this basis that industry policy goals can, in practice, be achieved without erasing the entire efficiency 
gain of extending the tax base.  
4.2 Reform 2: The enterprise exemption reform 
4.2.1 Main allocative and macroeconomic effects 
All enterprises are exempted from the electricity tax system in this reform, thus reducing the tax 
burden on primary industries and service producers. The direct effect is to decrease the input prices of 
electricity by 1.2 Eurocents/KWh in these productions, measured in 1999 prices. The loss of revenue 
is regained by increasing the percentage VAT rate on all goods, and in the long run it increases by 0.8 
percent, as reflected in Table 4. 
 
Domestic input prices tend to increase, as is seen for both the pre-tax electricity price and the wage 
rate in Table 4. The reason is increased pressure in the factor markets when the tax burden on 
                                                     
13 In terms of wages or capital income saved, the compensations can nevertheless be regarded substantial. The schemes 
studied in Bjertnæs (2005) do, for example, cost up to 25,000€ per job saved. 
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enterprises in the primary and service industries is relieved. The opposite impulse from higher VAT 
rates does not fully offset this. Electricity demand stimulates domestic electricity production. As for 
the previous reform, the Nordic electricity price responds most markedly in the earlier periods, and we 
see a crowding-out of net export during the first 15 years.  
 
 
Table 4: The enterprise exemption reform: main economic effects. Percentage deviation from 
BaU. 
 2005 2015 Steady state 
VAT tax rate 1.4 1.3 0.8 
Pre-tax electricity price 0.8 0.0 0.0 
Nominal wage rate to workers 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Consumer price index -0.0 0.0 0.0 
Production of electricity 0.4 1.2 1.3 
GDP 0.06 0.06 0.04 
Real capital  0.23 0.24 0.17 
Consumption  0.00 0.00 0.02 
Labour supply -0.01 0.00 -0.00 
Utility 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Export –0.01 0.01 0.01 
Import -0.02 0.02 0.03 
 
The macroeconomic changes are even smaller than found in the previous reform case. GDP increases 
slightly, as do exports and consumption in the long run. Long run utility shows a very modest increase. 
This is explained by more consumption, while leisure (and labour supply) is virtually unaffected.  
4.2.2 Costs of revenue generation  
As we saw in the previous reform case, harmonising the electricity tax contributes positively to 
efficiency. Harmonising the tax among industries at a zero rate results in an efficiency gain of 0.01 per 
cent, or 8.6 € annually per capita on average compared to a differentiated system. Besides the effects 
of harmonisation, the gain reflects a terms-of-trade gain stemming from increased export prices of 
electricity and a slight increase in labour supply. The gain is about the double of the gain we found in 
case of harmonising at the ordinary tax rate. However, this doubling only reflects that the drop in the 
public budgets is not yet offset by costly tax funding. 
 
We take financing into account by increasing the VAT rates proportionally.14 This causes the 
efficiency gain to fall to a fifth, or to an annual average of 1.8 € per person. It is nevertheless positive, 
                                                     
14 The VAT rates in the system of 1999 varied to a larger degree than today. Most importantly, services had zero rates.   
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indicating that exempting the industry is not more costly than maintaining the current tax rules. It has 
virtually no effect on labour supply, but provides a minor terms-of-trade gain through higher export 
prices of electricity. It is also worth noting that the reform implies a shift of tax burden from input 
factors to consumer goods. The positive welfare outcome provides some support for the principle of 
letting consumers bear the brunt of commodity taxation via VAT rather than taxing inputs (cf. 
Diamond and Mirlees, 1971).  
4.2.3 Impact on industrial distribution and competitiveness 
The main purpose of the current discriminatory system is to facilitate competitive conditions for the 
power-intensive export industries. The enterprise exemption reform does not alter their electricity tax 
rates. However, we also need to understand how the reforms affect the remaining economy and cause 
feedbacks into the power-intensive manufacturing before concluding on the effects on their 
competitiveness.  
 
Table 5 shows the competitiveness impacts of the enterprise exemption component. The changes are 
small both in terms of international and domestic competitiveness of Norwegian firms. The direct 
effect of the tax reductions is to stimulate firms within the primary and tertiary sectors, but usually 
their electricity input constitutes small fractions of total costs. Thus, we see only modest pressure on 
the labour force and a slight wage rate increase. Nor does the change in taxation have much of an 
effect on the pre-tax price of power. Consequently, we see only marginal skewing of the domestic 
resource distribution in the direction of raw material production, servicing and power production. The 
fall in international competitiveness for the power-intensive manufacturing sector is minimal, and in 
the long run we even find a slight improvement of competitiveness in the foreign markets, which 
reflects that lowered prices on domestic services benefit the export industries. Removing the tax on all 
commercial electricity use thus seems to succeed well in giving attention to the competitiveness of the 
manufacturing sector.  
Table 5: The enterprise exemption reform: long-term competitiveness and market share effects. 
Percentage deviation from BaU. 
  International competitiveness Domestic competitiveness 
 
I Competitive-
   nessa 
II Domestic  
    market sharesb
III Export 
        
IV Competitive-  
      nessa 
V Production  
     sharec 
Power intensive manufactures -0.01 -0.02 0.04 -0.07 -0.04 
Other manufactures -0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.07 -0.04 
Raw materials and services 0.08 0.03 0.26 0.02 0.02 
Electricity - - - -0.06 1.46 
a Changes in international competitiveness are defined as the changes in the relative marginal cost levels abroad and at home, while changes 
in domestic competitiveness measure the cost level changes in the industry relative to that of the economy at large.  
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b Domestic market share changes are changes in deliveries from domestic producers relative to imports.  
c Production share changes are operationalised as the changes in industry output levels relative to economy-wide output.  
-: Not defined. 
4.3 Reform 3: The complete removal reform 
4.3.1 Main allocative and macroeconomic effects 
The first round effect of removing the electricity tax completely is a reduction in the household price 
of electricity in addition to the input cost reductions within servicing and primary production. The 
increase in demand for electricity gives an impetus to domestic power generation and reduces net 
export. These effects are stronger than in the case of enterprise exemptions, only, but still modest due 
to relatively low price elasticity of household demand.  
 
Some main economic responses are reported in Table 6. The increase in demand for electricity leads to 
a marginal increase in the Nordic price of electricity, but even in the short run, only about 5 per cent of 
the tax reduction accrues to producers through higher prices. In the long run, as elaborated above, the 
producer price is virtually unaffected, and the whole tax cut benefits the consumers that directly face 
the tax removal.      
 
The loss of revenue is regained by a uniform percentage increase of the VAT rates on goods and 
services. In the long run it increases by 4.3 percent. The VAT component contributes to increase 
consumer prices, and in equilibrium this more than offsets the consumer price reductions caused by 
the electricity tax removal so that the consumer price index increases. This effect is stronger than the 
positive effect on wages and results in lower real wages and a subsequent labour supply decrease. 
GDP falls marginally in the long run, as does consumption. Due to a small increase in leisure, long run 
utility does not decrease.  
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Table 6: The complete removal reform: economic effects; percentage deviation from BaU. 
                                      Period 2005 2015 Steady state 
VAT tax rate 5.1 5.0 4.3 
Pre-tax electricity price 2.1 0.1 0.2 
Nominal wage rate to workers 0.0 0.1 0.1 
Consumer price index 0.3 0.3 0.2 
Production of electricity 1.4 4.4 6.8 
GDP -0.02 0.02 -0.02 
Real capital  0.09 0.18 0.10 
Consumption  -0.05 -0.04 -0.00 
Labour supply -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 
Utility 0.00 -0.01 0.01 
Export –0.02 0.04 0.06 
Import 0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
4.3.2 Costs of revenue generation  
When we remove tax on electricity use within households in addition to enterprises, while maintaining 
revenue levels by increasing the VAT rates, the efficiency gain compared to BaU is half that of 
exempting enterprises, only. In actual per capita numbers, it is reduced from 1.8 to 0.9 € on average 
per year. This loss to the economy is consistent with the so-called Ramsey efficiency principle, 
according to which the consumption of relatively inelastic goods – like electricity – represents the best 
candidates for taxation. Bye and Åvitsland (2008) confirm that this is a property of the model we use. 
The loss is further explained insofar as labour supply falls as VAT rates rise. The reform accentuates 
the inefficiency stemming from the fact that a high efficient tax on labour in the first place has resulted 
in an already sub-optimally low labour supply from a social point of view. Nevertheless, as there 
seems to be a net gain, though small, of removing the system completely, our analysis indicates that 
the revenue argument is not a particularly cogent justification for retaining the differentiated electricity 
tax as a source of revenue. 
4.3.3 Impact on household distribution 
From a redistributive perspective, imposing relatively low consumer taxes on electricity would be 
beneficial. Since electricity expenses constitute relatively high budget shares in low-income 
households, we would expect these households to gain the most from the tax removal reform; see 
section 2. This section sets out to quantify the redistributive effect of the complete removal reform, 
when the VAT funding is taken into consideration.  
 
The model used above in analysing impacts on efficiency and industry patterns is not suitable for 
studying income-distributional aspects of reforms, the reason being its assumption of a representative 
household; see section 3. We therefore supplement those simulations with an analysis of the income 
23 
effects within different income categories of the consumer price changes derived above. By 
quantifying the amount of money redistributed from more and less wealthy individuals, we obtain 
comparable measures of the achievements of the reform in terms of efficiency and redistribution.  
 
We use three household categories: poor (P), intermediate (M), and wealthy (R). The information on 
consumption and characteristics of households within these categories is collected from the micro 
simulation model LOTTE-Konsum 1999, cf. Statistics Norway (2006). It is calibrated against the base 
year macro figures used in our macro model. The micro simulation model contains 26,825 individuals 
in 9,964 households, weighted so that they satisfactorily represent the population of Norway across 
many dimensions. All households are ranked by a measure of the living standard (total consumption 
spending divided by consumption units on the OECD scale). Table 7 sets out the basic data and 
calculated results. P’s expenses on electricity (1. row) and in total (2. row) equal average expenses of 
the 20 per cent of households in the lowest living standard bracket. R’s are the expenses of the 20 per 
cent of households in the highest living standard bracket, while M’s expenses correspond to those of 
the remaining 60 per cent. 
 
Over the longer term, after gas power has been phased in, the producer price of electricity will remain 
unchanged and the entire electricity tax cut will manifest into reduced household prices. By removing 
the electricity tax of 1.2 Eurocents/KWh plus the VAT imposed on it at 0.3 Eurocents/KWh, we obtain 
a price fall of 1.5 Eurocents/KWh, or 20 per cent. In these calculations we assume that the expenses 
related to electricity falls proportionally to the price by holding use of electricity in each household 
group fixed. The gain of removing the tax will then be as reported in third row of Table 7. The loss of 
revenue is neutralised by a uniform increase of the VAT rate. We assume further that the rise in 
expenses caused by higher VAT rates is proportional to total consumer spending.  
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Table 7. The complete removal reform: distributive effects among households. 1999 €.a 
 Household P Household M Household R 
Total consumption ex-
penses 
15,737 33,276 58,806 
Electricity expenses 721 990 1,271 
Gain from removal of 
electricity tax  
142 194 250 
Loss due to increased 
VAT 
88 186 328 
Total effect of reform 54 8 -78 
No. of persons per 
household 
1.8 2.3 2.0 
Total effect per person 29 4 -39 
a The figures in rows 1, 2, and 6 are based on the micro-simulation model LOTTE-Konsum 1999, with the method applied by Schroyen and 
Aasness (2006, Table A2). P = the 20 per cent of Norwegian households with the lowest standard of living, R= the 20 per cent with the 
highest, and M= the remaining 60 per cent.  
 
The P household spends most of its budget on electricity and benefits more from the tax removal than 
it loses due to increased VAT. Overall gain per person is 29€. The wealthy household spends least of 
its budget on electricity and would benefit less from the removal of the tax than it loses because of the 
rise in VAT. In all, R households forfeit 39€ per person. The middle class (M) benefits slightly from 
the reform as a whole, 4€ per person.  
 
Our calculations indicate that if Norway rescinded the electricity tax and balanced the loss by raising 
VAT, the distributive effect would be beneficial. These results seem qualitatively robust to several 
departures from the original set of assumptions. As we have already argued, the producer price of 
electricity is insensitive to reduced taxes, also in the shorter term, so that the short-term distributive 
effect is almost the same as the long-term effect estimated in table 7. Schroyen and Aasness (2006) 
employ the same microsimulation model but estimate a decile table instead of the simple threefold 
division used in table 7. Their findings support our main result. Using a similar microsimulation 
model, Aasness et al. (2002) estimated an inequality measure for the whole population and also found 
a favourable distributive effect of a combination of lower electricity tax and higher VAT. 
 
Income elasticity for electricity for a household can be defined as the change in per cent of electricity 
consumption when income (or total consumption expenses) rises by 1 per cent, all other relevant 
factors being constant. This quantity could be a useful indicator of distribution (see Aasness, 1998, and 
Aasness and Røed Larsen, 2003). A number of estimates have been run on this type of income 
elasticity of electricity on data obtained by Norwegian consumer surveys from 1967 to the present (see 
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for instance Biørn, 1978, Aasness, 1998, and Halvorsen et al., 2005). All demonstrate an income 
elasticity well below 0.5. This suggests that electricity should be taxed lightly from a distributive point 
of view. They also confirm the result’s robustness to changes in income levels and relative prices. 
However, tests of even lower electricity taxation of households shows that more redistribution will 
come at the cost of efficiency losses. Recall from the preceding section (4.3.2) that the present reform 
implies but a very slight welfare gain compared to BaU, due to negative efficiency contributions from 
substituting general VAT taxation for household electricity taxation. Going further in that direction 
very soon brings us into ranches where the negative efficiency effects dominate.15 
 
We should point out that we are only analysing the effects of reducing current proportional electricity 
tax rates, replacing them with increased VAT rates. Introducing a system of progressive electricity 
taxes for the household sector has been proposed, with rates tracking electricity consumption. 
Amenable to several designs, it would make it possible, in principle, to assuage the negative 
distributive effects of electricity taxes, even indeed to make distributive effects positive (see Aasness, 
1998). It was, however, considered administratively costly and inaccurate as a distributive measure by 
a government commission set up to examine progressive electricity taxes for the household sector 
(Norwegian Ministry of Finance, 2004). We have not attempted to analyse these issues. For an 
inclusive assessment of the distributive effects of various instruments, we refer the reader to Aasness 
et al. (2002). 
5 Conclusions 
The main motivation for a reform of the Norwegian electricity tax system in 2004 was to satisfy the 
ESA requirements of non-discrimination among enterprises. In order to keep up the competitiveness of 
energy-dependent industries, as well as the public revenues from electricity taxation, a complicated 
legal system was implemented. In this study we ask whether there are other reform alternatives worth 
considering, when taking into account conflicting concerns among several public goals and among 
numerous mechanisms within a realistic economy riddled with imperfections and existing tax wedges. 
This analysis helps sorting out which economic principles that are at work and come to dominate in 
the alternative cases, and it concludes on the rounded goal achievements of the reforms. 
 
                                                     
15 Simulations of a twice as large cut in consumers’ electricity tax at the expense of even higher rates on remain-
ing goods, yields a distinct welfare loss, equivalent to 11.2 € yearly per capita. 
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The first reform alternative, which imposes the same tax rate on the manufacturing industries as 
applies in general, involves the most challenging political trade-offs. On the one hand, the reform 
violates the expressed governmental objective of keeping up the competitiveness of the power-
intensive industries. On the other hand, even though this could involve transitional efficiency costs 
associated with restructuring of the private sector, we find that the long run economic efficiency 
improves. This is especially clear when the extra revenue is used to replace former labour taxation. In 
other words, the revenue generation argument goes in favour of two recommendations from the 
theoretical literature of, firstly, harmonising tax conditions among enterprises, and, secondly, reducing 
labour taxation.  
 
In order to avoid the trade-off above, our results suggest a second reform alternative, where tax 
exemption is provided for all commercial undertakings at the cost of higher VAT rates. This ensures 
an industrial distribution in agreement with the expressed industrial and regional aims of the 
government. At the same time, efficiency is found to increase. Thus, again our findings leave no 
support to the argument that the current discriminatory system should be preserved for public financial 
reasons. There are benefits from harmonising tax conditions among industries, and these turn out to 
dominate the increased distortions caused by higher VAT rates, not least through increasing labour 
taxation and reducing labour supply. An additional positive effect not included is a probable saving of 
administration costs, as the current system has become fairly detailed in order to comply with the EU 
legislation. All in all, exempting the commercial sector stands out as a good alternative to the current 
usage-based tax differentiation system.  
 
The third reform study is primarily motivated by the anticipated favourable redistributive effects. It 
involves extending the tax elimination to also embrace households, while increasing VAT rates 
further. This reform seems able to achieve all the goals we have focused on. It satisfies the ESA 
requirements of non-discrimination, preserves the competitiveness of the power-intensive sector, while 
at the same time shows favourable efficiency and distributive effects. It looks as if the authorities will 
not need to weigh and prioritise the different goals we have examined.  It is nevertheless worth noting 
that our results reflect the predicted conflict between taxation principles for efficiency and equity 
concerns, respectively.  Equity principles propose relatively lenient taxation of goods with high budget 
shares in low-income households, like electricity. Opposed to this, the Ramsey efficiency principle 
proposes to tax necessities with relatively high rates. While satisfying the equity principle, the 
efficiency principle is violated when moving from the second to the third reform scenario. This 
27 
violation, along with efficiency losses of higher VAT rates through a further discouragement of labour 
supply, bisects the efficiency gain, but still leaves it positive when compared with the current system.   
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